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Taking Stock of Trade Protectionism Since 2008 
Mohini Datt, Bernard Hoekman, and Mariem Malouche
Active Use of T rade Policy Measures 
According to monitoring reports issued by the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), a total of 1,243 new trade measures have 
been implemented since the onset in late 2008 of the current 
financial crisis. Some 900 of these measures were trade restric-
tive (figure 1), while 327 reduced the level of import protection 
(figure 2). Each year since the crisis erupted has seen about 300 
new trade restrictions imposed. Data up to July 2011 had indi-
cated a drop in this annual tally, but data for Q3 2011 indicate 
the tally has risen again.1 
The Global Trade Alert (GTA), which covers a larger spec-
trum of actions that may affect trade, reports a total of 1,593 
measures implemented between November 2008 and Novem-
ber 2011, of which 1,187 discriminated against foreign suppli-
ers and 406 were liberalizing (figure 3).2 The total number of 
new trade measures has consistently increased over the 10 sum-
mary monitoring reports the GTA has issued to date, reflecting 
the fact that many measures are not made public immediately 
and are only “discovered” over time. The number of new pro-
tectionist actions peaked in the first quarter of 2009 and bot-
tomed in the third quarter of 2010. GTA data suggest that new 
protectionist measures in 2011 are running at levels similar to 
what was observed in 2010, and protectionist actions in the 
third quarter of 2011 alone are as high as in the worst periods 
of 2009 (Evenett 2011c).  G-20 countries account for the bulk 
of all measures according to both sources, and their share has 
increased from 60 percent of the total in 2009 to about 80 per-
cent in 2011—implying that the largest countries are the most 
active users of trade policy instruments (figure 4). 
Many countries actively pursued liberalizing measures, par-
ticularly in the second and third years after the onset of the cri-
sis (figure 2).  In fact, tariffs were more frequently lowered/lib-
eralized than they were hiked, reflecting efforts to lower prices 
(costs) of goods used by domestic industries and/or consumed 
by households (mostly food items). The number of all trade lib-
eralizing measures increased by two-thirds between October 
Following the onset of the financial crisis in September 2008 and the subsequent “Great Trade Collapse” (Baldwin 2009), 
many countries actively used trade policy instruments as part of their response to the global recession. Governments pursued 
a mix of trade liberalization, trade promotion, and trade restrictions. The choice of trade policy has varied, with limited use 
of tariff hikes or antidumping and safeguard actions. Sector-specific support to industries dominated initial responses to the 
crisis, and there has been increasing resort to nontariff measures. Recent research suggests that vertical specialization—the 
growth in global supply chains—has played a significant role in limiting the use of traditional protectionist instruments. 
Pressures on governments to support domestic economic activity may increase, given current gloomy economic prospects and 
more binding macroeconomic policy constraints, and the number of protectionist measures has recently risen. Open trade 
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2009 and September 2010 compared with the previous year. 
One-fifth of the restrictive nontariff measures implemented 
since the crisis were subsequently removed.  
Countries can be grouped into trade policy activists—pursu-
ing a mix of trade-restricting and trade-liberalizing actions—and 
trade policy passivists. The most active users of trade policy since 
2008 include Brazil, China, India, and the Russian Federation—
the BRICs.3 These countries—as did others such as Pakistan and 
Indonesia—imposed both new trade restrictive measures and 
took actions to reduce the prices of certain imports (figure 5).   
India initiated the greatest number of restrictive trade measures, 
followed by Argentina, the European Union, Brazil, Indonesia, 
the United States, China, and Russia. Among the non-G-20 mid-
dle-income economies, Vietnam, Pakistan, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ecuador were the most active (figure 5).
Differentiated Use of Import Tariffs 
The scope that exists to raise tariffs is a function of the extent to 
which countries have bound their tariffs in the WTO. Many 
developed countries have bound their tariffs at the actual ap-
plied levels, whereas many developing countries have not 
bound tariffs in the WTO or have made so-called ceiling bind-
ings that are much higher than their applied tariff rates. This 
implies that developing countries often have significant scope 
to raise tariffs in response to a recession, whereas high-income 
nations do not. 
Excluding antidumping and other forms of contingent pro-
tection, tariffs were more frequently lowered than raised. No-
table examples of tariff liberalization by G-20 members in-
clude a decision by Mexico to reduce tariffs on some 5,000 
tariff lines (97 percent of all imports), with average tariffs fall-
Source: Authors’ calculations using WTO data from 2009, 2010b, 2011b.
Note: Total = 916; TTB = temporary trade barriers (antidumping, countervailing 
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ing from over 10 percent to 4.6 percent; the U.S. Miscellaneous 
Tariff Bill, which temporarily suspended import tariffs on myr-
iad intermediate goods through end-2012; and the phasing 
down of tariffs to 5–10 percent by 2015 on 23 HS 2-digit lines 
by Australia, affecting hundreds of products, including textiles, 
clothing, footwear, and a range of industrial goods. Canada 
eliminated tariffs on over 1,500 products—mostly machinery, 
equipment, and industrial inputs. Non-G-20 countries also 
implemented instances of tariff liberalization, although mostly 
modest in nature and limited to just a few products (figure 6). 
Of course, the number of tariff hikes or reductions does not say 
much about the political intent or the impact on trade volume. 
Determining the net impact of trade policy responses on trade 
flows and the effective levels of protection for affected indus-
tries requires detailed research.
Most tariff decreases seen after the 2008 crisis appear to 
have aimed at lowering prices of food staples, consumer goods, 
and industrial inputs such as machinery, parts, and compo-
nents. Production of manufactured goods is increasingly orga-
nized through global value chains, with goods being processed 
(value being added) in multiple countries that are part of the 
chain. Plants in each country specialize in specific processing 
activities that make up a final product. As a result of this verti-
cal specialization, a significant share of the value of any export 
reflects imported inputs. For the world as a whole, the import 
content of exports is about 30 percent (Daudin, Rifflart, and 
Schweisguth 2011). Using the data compiled by Daudin, Rif-
flart and Schweisguth, Gawande, Hoekman, and Cui (2011) 
show that the intensity of vertical specialization helps to ex-























































Figure 5. Number of Newly Initiated Trade Measures, 89 Countries, September 2008 – July 2011
Source: Authors’ calculations using WTO data from 2009, 2010b, 2011b.
Note: CU of Blr, Kzk, Rus = Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation.4  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
of production. Brazil is an example of a country that is both low-
ering and hiking tariffs to support its domestic industry. For 
example, Brazil reduced tariffs to 2 percent on hundreds of 
capital goods and equipment in 2010 and again recently in Au-
gust 2011,4 with the objective of supporting domestic down-
stream industries.  At the same time, it also increased taxes by 
30 percent on vehicles (including trucks) that have less than 65 
percent local content and do not originate in Mercosur coun-
tries5 or Mexico. Brazil is also expected to implement a 3 per-
cent tax rebate to exporters of manufactured products.6 Other 
economies have also intervened in trade to support domestic 
industry. For example, Indonesia eliminated tariffs earlier this 
year on 182 raw materials (including soybean oil, crude petro-
leum, and numerous inorganic chemicals) and capital goods; 
raised tariffs on imports of prepared food; and imposed export 
taxes on cocoa. 
In a few instances, countries hiked tariffs substantially, 
mostly on food products. In 2009, Russia increased tariffs to 
50–80 percent on certain meat products, some of which were 
subsequently removed. Turkey increased tariffs on certain 
grains to 130 percent in May 2009, and then eliminated them 
in February 2011. Since 2008, tariff reductions on food prod-
ucts have been pursued by governments seeking to contain 
food price increases in their domestic markets. The number of 
tariff reductions on food products (80+) since late 2008 great-
ly exceeds the number of tariff hikes on such products (20).   
Half of all such tariff reductions pertained to grains, sugar, 
and edible oils. For example, Morocco lowered tariffs on dif-
ferent types of wheat from highs of 135–170 percent to 80–
90 percent in 2010; Kenya reduced tariffs on rice from 75 to 
35 percent. 
The tariff hikes that were imposed since the crisis have not 
reversed the trend of steadily declining average applied tariffs in 
the last 15 years (figure 7). The average most-favored-nation 
(MFN) tariff of developing country G-20 members fell from 
14 percent in 1999 to about 10 per-
cent in 2010. As a result of this lib-
eralization, the tariff gap between 
emerging/developing and advanced 
G-20 members has narrowed from 
10 to about 5 percentage points. Ac-
tually applied tariffs on trade are 
less than the average MFN rate as a 
result of preferential trade agree-
ments and trade preference pro-
grams. 
Limited Use of Anti-
dumping and Safeguard 
Actions 
Countries may use temporary trade 
barriers (TTBs) such as antidump-
are two channels: the first that higher tariffs are a tax on down-
stream processing parts of the chain, so importing governments 
have an incentive to keep tariffs low. The second is that these 
firms (chains) have an interest in the governments of the coun-
tries producing the inputs they use to keep trade costs low—in-
cluding through low or zero tariffs. This benefits the exporting 
countries that are further down the chain, and those that pro-
duce the inputs through higher overall exports (sales of the final 
product). One or both of these vertical specialization effects are 
found to be statistically significant determinants of reductions 
in 2009 tariffs.
There are also incentives for lowering trade costs for indus-
tries that are not part of global value chains. Reducing input 
costs through either tariff reduction on imports or taxing ex-
ports of locally produced raw materials can increase the effec-
tive protection of domestic industries. Conversely, if there is a 
significant parts and components industry and a country is less 
integrated into global value chains, governments may have an 
incentive to raise tariffs on inputs and/or final products. Thus, 
incentives continue to exist to engage in traditional protection-














Figure 6. New Tariff Measures, G-20 /Non-G-20, September 2008 
– October 2011
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Figure 7. Average G-20 Tariffs, 1996–2010, Simple MFN Applied Average 
Source: WITS data (TRAINS + WTO-IDB), OECD; tariff data missing for Russia 1998–2000,  Saudi Arabia 1996–98, 2010,  
Indonesia 1997, India 2010, European Union 2010,  and South Africa 1998.5  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
ing (AD), countervailing duty (CVD), and safeguard (SFG) 
measures instead of tariffs; the use of such instruments gener-
ally peaks during recessions when domestic industries invoke 
them to reduce foreign competition and keep more of the 
market for themselves (Leidy 1997). Most countries have leg-
islation allowing for TTBs to be used when imports put too 
much pressure on domestic industries. Such instruments of 
contingent protection are permitted under WTO rules 
and many preferential trade agreements. A key feature of 
these TTBs is that they require an investigation to deter-
mine whether the preconditions for taking action have 
been satisfied. 
TTBs were a frequently used policy instrument in the 
post-2008 period, with the WTO reporting a total of some 
370 new investigations (282 AD, 45 CVD, and 43 SFG) 
into alleged foreign dumping, subsidization, or requests for 
temporary protection by G-20 members.7 Frequent users 
of TTBs include India (68); the European Union (56); Ar-
gentina (45); the United States (45); Brazil (34); Indonesia 
(22); Australia (21); and China (20) (figure 8). One-fifth of 
postcrisis TTB investigations were subsequently dropped, 
many within a year of initiation, as a result of failing to sat-
isfy required criteria (for example, pertaining to injury caused 
by imports, dumping, or subsidization).  Just under half of all 
new TTB investigations led to duties, whether provisional or 
definitive. There is considerable heterogeneity in the average 
level of AD duties imposed, varying by imposing country and 
affected trade partner. AD duties imposed on Chinese prod-
ucts tend to be substantially higher than those imposed on 
products from other exporters (Bown 2010a). For example, the 
average ad valorem duty imposed by the United States on Chi-
nese exports in the postcrisis period was 149 percent, com-
pared to 45 percent on the products of other exporters.8 
However, taking a longer-term perspective, the use of AD 
has been falling steadily since the late 1990s, with the crisis 
leading to only a small increase. Overall, the number of AD 
actions is still far below the average levels observed a decade ago 
(figure 9). To date, fewer TTBs have been put in place than 
what would have been expected judging by previous reces-
sions. The stock of products covered by TTBs imposed by de-
veloping G-20 members has increased, rising from 1.71 per-
cent in 2007 to 2.55 percent in 2009 (Bown 2010b),9 but in 
the aggregate, TTBs have not had a significant impact on trade 
volumes. One reason for the low coverage is that three-quarters 
of all TTBs are AD, which is product and firm specific, as op-
posed to safeguards, which tend to affect broader industries 
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Figure 8. Newly Initiated TTBs, Selected Most Active Users Among 
G-20, Non-G-20 Countries
Source: Authors’ calculations using WTO data from 2009, 2010b, 2011b.








































Figure 9. A Steady Reduction in Protectionism, 1995–2010



























Figure 10. TTB Database—Antidumping Initiations by Developed/
Developing Countries, 2007–10
Source: Bown 2011.6  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
were quantitative import restrictions, quotas, and bans.10 Im-
port licensing and discriminatory government procurement 
accounted for another 25 percent (figure 11). The number of 
“buy national” measures (including local content/national 
preference incentives) increased significantly in 2011, espe-
cially in emerging market G-20 members, affecting sectors 
such as energy, telecom, and motor vehicles. As is the case 
with tariffs, the direction of policy has not been uniform. 
Since January 2009, some 44 NTMs that predated the crisis 
were removed, half by India, followed by China (figure 12; 
WTO 2011a). One-fifth of NTMs imposed since 2008 have 
been removed or are explicitly time bound.
The rise in the relative importance and use of NTMs by de-
veloping countries does not reflect WTO constraints limiting 
their ability to use tariffs, given the substantial room for ma-
neuver that exists between bound tariff rates and actual ap-
plied rates. More important may be the constraints imposed by 
membership in regional trade agreements. For example, Argen-
tina has increased the use of nonautomatic import licensing, a 
process under which import approvals are discretionary (WTO 
rules require a decision within 60 days), and that applies to all 
sources of imports, including from Mercosur.11 The Argentine 
government has also introduced technical requirements for 
myriad imported products that act as trade barriers. Brazil has 
also introduced nonautomatic import licensing for over 40 
product groups at the HS 4-digit level, including vehicles, car 
parts and consumer goods (confectionary), and is giving tax 
credits to manufacturers of cars and trucks that use locally pro-
duced inputs. 
Almost one-third of all NTMs are imposed on exports, espe-
cially of agricultural goods, with a clear upward trend in the use 
of export restrictions (WTO 2011b), underscoring the need 
for stronger WTO disciplines (Martin and Anderson 2011). 
NTMs on exports also take different forms. Half of all export 
restrictions were quantitative in nature rather than price based 
(taxes or duties). Countries imposing restrictions include Ar-
gentina, India, China, Ukraine, Indonesia, Bolivia and Pakistan, 
with many of the measures affecting grains and raw materials.   
India has been a frequent user of export restrictions for grains 
and food products as well as for exports of textiles and leather. 
China has restricted the export of certain minerals and raw ma-
terials and increased rebates on a gamut of industrial goods. 
China also recently lost the panel stage of a WTO dispute 
brought by several countries against export taxes on a variety of 
natural resources. Overall, export taxes mostly affected raw ma-
terials such as ores, metal scrap, minerals, cotton, yarn, and raw 
cocoa. A number of countries also increased export incentives 
for specific products (for example, dairy products). Examples 
include the United States, European Union and Switzerland, as 
well as India, Brazil, and China. 
NTMs have become more prevalent partially as a response 


































Figure 11. G-20 NTMs, September 2008 – October 2011
Source: Authors’ calculations using WTO data from 2009, 2010b, 2011b.
Note: Total=166
and all sources of imports. The product coverage of AD actions 
has remained similar to precrisis coverage—chemicals, plastics, 
metals, paper, and machinery—suggesting AD was not seen by 
firms as an effective instrument to help them deal with crisis-
induced market pressures. 
While the aggregate impact of TTBs on global trade vol-
umes has been limited to date, it is important to recognize that 
AD action is long lasting (generally more than five years) and 
can give rise to retaliatory measures that generate further pro-
tectionism. Developing countries have been taking over from 
high-income economies (the traditional users of AD), reflect-
ing both increased institutional capacity and the rise of China 
as an export powerhouse (figure 10). AD is increasingly a 
south–south phenomenon, with China the main target (Bown 
2011). 
Increased Use of Less T ransparent Forms 
of Industry Support
While the post-2008 use of tariffs and TTBs has been con-
tained, nontariff measures (NTMs) are being used more fre-
quently. The number of new trade-restricting NTMs averaged 
85 per year in the first two years after the onset of the crisis, 
and increased considerably in 2011 to over 120 (figure 1). De-
veloping G-20 countries have been the main users of NTMs, 
including India (38), China (25), Indonesia (25), Argentina 
(23), and Russia (15). NTMs are generally less transparent 
than tariffs and often generate greater distortions because 
they limit trade volumes. A little less than half of all NTMs 7  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
against health and environmental hazards. While technical 
regulations and product standards are appropriate policy in-
struments to ensure public safety and achieve other policy 
objectives, they can also be a disguised form of protection. 
While analysis of the trade restrictiveness of NTMs has long 
been constrained by a lack of data, a recent multiagency effort 
(involving the African Development Bank, the International 
Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, and the World Bank)—the Transparency in 
Trade Initiative—is improving the cross-country availability 
of information on NTM use. Moreover, a toolkit has recently 
been developed by the World Bank’s Trade Department that 
recognizes the complexity of NTMs and can be used by gov-
ernments and stakeholders to minimize restrictive impacts on 
trade (Cadot, Malouche and Saez 2012).
Greater transparency and monitoring of both NTMs and 
industry-specific support measures is a priority. Many govern-
ments responded to the crisis by complementing fiscal and 
monetary stimulus measures with industry-specific support, 
such as loans and guarantees for classes of firms (such as SMEs) 
or specific firms (bailouts, equity infusions) and financial sup-
port for certain activities such as the development of green 
technologies. These measures can distort competition and dis-
criminate against foreign firms because they often explicitly 
target national firms. The GTA reported over 100 state aids 
and bailout measures with a discriminatory trade effect as of 
December 2009, a year after the onset of the crisis. Over the 
three-year period since late 2008, the GTA reported a total of 
273 actions supporting national industries (Evenett 2011c). 
The sectors most frequently targeted by ongoing support pro-
grams are agriculture and motor vehicles. 
Impacts on T rade: Limited Overall, But 
Significant for Some Countries and  
Products
There is considerable debate regarding the impact of the post-
2008 trade policy actions. Trade flows collapsed spectacularly in 
2009, but recovered almost as rapidly when economic activity 
picked up (figure 13). The magnitude and rapidity of the 
bounce back reflects the limited impact of protectionist mea-
sures. The WTO estimates that G-20-initiated trade measures 
currently affect a little over 2 percent of world trade (WTO 
2011b), up from about 1 percent in 2009. Evenett and Fritz 
(2010) estimate that a subset of 15 “jumbo” discriminatory 
measures affected more than 10 percent of world merchandise 
imports in 2008. Such calculations do not tell us anything about 
the ad valorem tariff equivalent of the measures concerned or 
their incidence, a matter that requires further research. 
Clearly the impact of trade restrictions on specific products 
can be significant. Henn and McDonald (2011) match “red” 
measures from the GTA database (that is, trade restrictive, dis-
criminatory measures), for which the GTA could identify af-
fected trade partners and product categories, with monthly HS 
4-digit level bilateral trade data from the Global Trade Informa-
tion Services. Henn and McDonald conclude that trade flows 
that were affected by trade restrictions saw between a 5 and 8 
percent decrease relative to trade flows of the same product 
among partners that were not affected by protectionist mea-
sures. Exports of poorer developing economies were hit harder, 
with an 8 percent drop, compared to a 5 percent reduction in 
upper-middle-income countries.12 Against these negative im-
pacts, one must consider the effects of the liberalizing measures 
taken by many countries, as well as the general fiscal and mone-
tary stimulus measures taken by many countries that generated 
demand for imports. Henn and McDonald argue that bailout 
and stimulus programs put in place by high-income countries 
adversely affected developing-country exports by less than the 
border measures imposed by developing countries themselves. 
Concluding Remarks 
While there has been a marked increase in the use of trade pol-
icy since 2008, with developing countries particularly active, 
measures to restrict trade have been complemented by actions 
to reduce barriers for specific products. Average levels of import 
tariffs remain much lower than they were 10–15 years ago. 
TTBs such as AD were used less intensively than in past slow-
downs, especially by OECD nations. There has been a long-
term shift toward greater use of AD by developing countries, 
but here again, the global number of cases remains much lower 
Figure 12. Rollbacks of NTMs by the G-20
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Source: Authors’ calculations using WTO data from 2009, 2010b, 2011b.
Note: Total=78 (44 originally imposed precrisis); CU of Blr, Kzk, Rus = Customs Union of 
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than it was 15 years ago. Many trade policy measures were of-
ten aimed at lowering prices of consumer goods (for example, 
food) and inputs used by domestic industries. The more limit-
ed use of traditional protection measures—tariffs and TTBs—re-
flects the reality of a more intricately linked global trading envi-
ronment, where countries are increasingly part of global value 
chains (Baldwin and Evenett 2009; Dadush, Ali, and Odell 
2011). This has changed the traditional political economy dy-
namics of trade policy, where domestic industries and workers 
lobby for import protection. The changing nature of global pro-
duction and trade—increasingly, intermediate inputs and re-
exports—seems to have supported open trade. How robust this 
new constellation of trade interests will be is something that 
only time will tell. 
Disentangling the multitude of trade policy measures and 
their determinants (the underlying government objectives) 
will be a rich area for research in the years to come, helping 
stakeholders to better understand the political economy of 
trade policy in a world that is increasingly characterized by 
vertical specialization. The same applies to assessing the net 
impact of the policy responses on global trade. The fact that 
bailouts and stimulus packages—even if they were designed to 
be discriminatory—were significant in size and number, and 
most likely had beneficial effects on global trade, is a factor 
that must be considered in any assessment of the trade effects 
of 2008–9 policies.  
Less heartening is that the apparent slowdown in post-2008 
protectionist measures observed in the first half of 2011 was 
reversed in the summer of 2011 as a result of renewed econom-
ic uncertainty and a decline in already weak growth. There are 
increasing signs of pressure to support domestic industries. 
Global growth prospects are likely to remain subdued for some 
time to come and will impact trade volumes. The WTO recent-
ly revised its forecast for 2011 trade growth downward from 
6.5 percent to 5.8 percent. The scope for new stimulus mea-
sures is now much more limited than it was in 2008. A sluggish 
world economy, high unemployment rates across the globe, 
and inflation and currency appreciation in a number of 
emerging economies will continue to pressure governments 
to support domestic economic activity. Open trade cannot 
be taken for granted, thus continued monitoring of trade 
policy measures is necessary.
Notes
1. WTO data references reflect authors’ calculations, which 
are based on a compilation of measures reported in WTO 
(2009, 2010b, 2011b). 
2. The GTA is an initiative that brings together a network of 
think tanks and institutes from around the globe that col-
lect information on trade-related policy measures taken by 
governments in regions they are covering (see http://www.
GlobalTradeAlert.org).
3. The utility of grouping this set of countries together is fre-
quently criticized because there are so many differences be-
tween them, but it appears that they are similar when it comes 
to the use of trade policy. 
4. CAMEX (Chamber of Commerce, Brazil) December 2009 
and 2010; tariff reductions on Mercosur Common Nomencla-
ture (NCM) chapters 39, 40, 68, 73, 76, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 
90, and 94.  In August 2011, tariff eliminations took place on 
3,779 capital goods and 111 integrated systems (NCM chap-
ters 73, 81, 84, 85, 87, 90, and 94).
5. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
6. The Wall Street Journal, “Brazil Files Currency-Dumping Pro-
posal in WTO to Protect against Cheap Imports,” November 
15, 2011  (http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111114- 
718925.html). The Brazilian government blames the sharp ap-
preciation of its currency, the real, against the U.S. dollar since 
the end of 2008 for undermining the competitiveness of its 
industry in export markets and leading to a flood of cheaper 
imports, a situation that is argued to be exacerbated by inter-
ventions of other countries to undervalue their currencies to 
give their firms an export advantage.
7. What follows focuses only on new initiations of TTBs; duties 
imposed as a result of investigations launched before the crisis 
are excluded. WTO numbers are comparable with those in the 
World Bank’s TTB Database, which provides more detail than 
the WTO on the specifics of each case, including product 
codes, countries affected, and the level of duties imposed (see 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/temporary-trade-barri-
ers-database). 
8. Where data are available, dumping margins and ad valorem 
duties imposed by other countries on China show the same dis-
criminatory pattern.  
9. Number of products measured at the 6-digit level of the Har-
monized System (HS) of product classification.
10. Import bans were applied mainly for food products, espe-
cially meat and livestock, in response to natural disasters or ani-
mal diseases (for example, the H1N1 virus).
Figure 13. Trade Collapse and Recovery, Jan. 2008 - Oct. 2011 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Datastream.9  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
11. The Economist, “Keep Out,” September 24, 2011, (http://
www.economist.com/node/21530136?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/ar/
keepout).
12. Henn and McDonald (2011) note that having data at just 
the HS 4-digit level (as reported by the GTA) rather than HS 
6-digit level means that their estimates likely underestimate 
product-level effects.
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